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Article 9 Financing Statement Searches: Is a Rose by
Any Other Name Still a Rose?
I. INTRODUCTION
Is a rose by any other name still a rose? Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code establishes a system by which creditors can record a security interest
in collateral by filing a financing statement in the public records and subsequent
creditors can receive notice of this interest by searching these records. However,
the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code also included a provision which
seeks to forgive creditors for minor errors in the financing statement.
This Note first establishes the background of secured transaction law under
the Uniform Commercial Code and then evaluates the current standards ap-
plied by the courts in this area. Next the effect of computerization on financing
statement searches is analyzed, and the Note concludes by proposing a new
standard for evaluating misnomers. Namely, that since financing statements are
indexed under the debtor's last name, the courts should require absolute preci-
sion in order to protect the integrity of the notice system and to promote judi-
cial economy.
II. OPERATION OF ARTICLE 9
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter
"U.C.C." or "Code"], the process of obtaining a security interest varied greatly
depending on the type of collateral involved and the state in which the interest
was sought." As a result, a wide variety of security devices was developed for
the differing collateral. Among the more prominent security devices were the
chattel mortgage, the pledge, the conditional sale (i.e. the reservation of title
until full payment is received), and trust receipts.2 However, even with numer-
ous security devices, it was still unclear exactly how to obtain a security interest
in certain collateral.' To rectify these problems, Article 9 of the U.C.C. was
adopted to "provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense
variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less
cost and with greater certainty." 4
Under Article 9 of the U.C.C., the general rule is that filing a financing
statement 5 is required in order to perfect the security interest.6 However, as
I. Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter U.C.C.] § 9-101 Official Comment. All citations to the Uniform
Commercial Code are to the Official 1989 edition.
2. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 5-14 (2 ed. 1989).
3. U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Comment uses motion picture rights as one example of collateral which caused
problems.
4. U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Comment.
5. U.C.C. § 9-402. The financing statement is a short form used merely to impart notice on searchers. The
requirements are the names of the debtor and secured party, both the debtor's and secured party's addresses, a
description of the collateral by item or type, and the debtor's signature. U.C.C. § 9-402. The model form of a
financing statement is the U.C.C.-I.
6. U.C.C. § 9-302.
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with any rule, there are exceptions.7 The financing statement is then indexed in
the public records under the debtor's name8 and serves as notice to subsequent
creditors of the existing security interest.9 Realizing that if absolute precision
were required harsh results would occur as the result of only minor errors,10 the
drafters included paragraph 8 of Section 9-402 which reads: "[a] financing
statement substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effec-
tive even though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading."'"
III. ADOPTION AND THE OPERATION OF SECTION 9-402(8)
The Official Comment to U.C.C. Section 9-402(8) lays out the policy ob-
jective the drafters sought to achieve by the inclusion of Section 9-402(8) in the
Code. The comment reads: "[s]ubsection (8) is in line with the policy of this
Article to simplify formal requisites and filing requirements and is designed to
discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of such statutory re-
quirements in which courts have occasionally indulged themselves."' 2 The offi-
cial comment is a clear instruction to judges that strict adherence to the re-
quirements of U.C.C. Section 9-402 is not to be required. Further, in what
appears to be an attempt to prevent any misunderstanding of the underlying
policy, the Code drafters included an example of the type of reasoning that was
specifically rejected.'3 The example given was General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Haley.14
In Haley, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) entered into
a financing arrangement with the E.R. Millen Co., Inc. (Millen) through the
use of a trust receipt. The agreement allowed Millen to acquire various types of
merchandise and attempted to reserve a security interest in the merchandise in
favor of GMAC.'5 GMAC filed a statement with the Secretary of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts as the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act required;16 how-
ever, the filings were in the name of E.R. Millen Company rather than E.R.
Millen Co., Inc.' 7 Subsequently, Millen assigned all the merchandise to the de-
fendant Haley.' 8
The court held that GMAC did not have a security interest in the mer-
chandise because the filings" were not under the correct name.' 9 This result was
achieved even though the lower court made a finding of fact that one month
7. U.C.C. § 9-302 lists the circumstances when filing is not required.
8. U.C.C. § 9-403(4).
9. McLaughlin, "Seek But You May Not Find'" Non-U.C.C. Recorded, Unrecorded and Hidden Security
Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 953, 953 (1985).
10. U.C.C. § 9-402 Official Comment 9.
11. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (emphasis added).
12. U.C.C. § 9-402 Official Comment 9.
13. Id.
14. 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952).
15. Id. at 560, 109 N.E.2d at 144.
16. MAss. GEN. L. (Ter. Ed.) ch. 255A § 8, inserted by St. 1936, c. 264. This statute has been repealed by
Article 9 of the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (note to legislatures accompanying statute).
17. 329 Mass. at 560, 109 N.E.2d at 144.
18. Id. at 561, 109 N.E.2d at 144.
19. Id. at 566, 109 N.E.2d at 147-48.
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prior to incorporation, Millen was in fact doing business in the same location
under the name of E.R. Millen Company.2 0
When faced with these facts, it is understandable why the Code drafters
chose Haley as an example of the apparent harshness of an exactness standard.
However, to stop one's inquiry into Haley here would be doing injustice to Jus-
tice Wilkins, who authored the Haley opinion.
At first glance it appears that Justice Wilkins was exalting form over sub-
stance and arriving at an inequitable result; however, the reasoning of the opin-
ion tells a very different tale. After acknowledging GMAC's argument that no
one could be deceived under the facts of the case (similarity of the names, ad-
dresses, and goods involved)2 1 Justice Wilkins noted the ambiguities that would
result by ruling for GMAC by stating:
Any relaxation in strict interpretation tends, in a given case, to carry in the opposite
direction and, for future cases, to open the door wider to still other variations. Even if
we assume that a person consulting the index would find the way to the particular
statement with which we are now concerned, we nevertheless are not sure how great a
duty of investigation the statute fairly intended should be imposed upon the public
22
Thus, the example the drafters used in justification of Section 9-402(8) was, in
fact, decided based on the same policy that Article 9 of the U.C.C. sought to
further.23
A. Filing Location Under Section 9-401
Through the adoption of U.C.C. Section 9-401, the drafters established a
public filing system which, like other filing systems, is designed to give notice to
searchers. 2' U.C.C. Section 9-401 designates the place in which a financing
statement should be filed, and in a digression from the uniformity which is char-
acteristic of most sections of.the Code, gives the states three alternatives.2 5 The
first alternative designates the Secretary of State's office for the given state as
the primary place of filing. The only exceptions to this filing location are for
filings where the collateral consists of minerals, uncut timber, interstate ac-
counts, or fixtures, and in these cases the filing location is in the office for real
estate mortgage filings.2
6
In the second alternative, the primary place of filing is again the Secretary
of State's office, and the same exceptions also are carried over. However, the
second alternative adds a filing in the county office where the debtor is located
20. Id. at 561, 109 N.E.2d at 144.
21. Id. at 564, 109 N.E.2d at 146.
22. Id. at 564, 109 N.E.2d at 146.
23. U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Comment lists the aim of Article 9 as "a simple and unified structure. . . with
less cost and with greater certainty." U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Comment (emphasis added).
24. Donnellan, Notice and Filing Under Article 9, 29 Mo. L. Ray. 517, 517 (1964).
25. U.C.C. § 9-401(1).
26. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) Alternative 1. Among the states adopting the first alternative are Delaware, Georgia,
and Wiscosin.
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for filings in which the collateral is farm equipment, farm products, or accounts
receivable from farming operations.27
The third alternative given to the states keeps the same filings as were
present in the second alternative and also adds a duplicative filing in the office
of county records for all collateral that under alternatives one and two would
have been filed only in the Secretary of State's office.28
As a result of the variation in size and sophistication of counties through-
out the United States, as well as the variation in the amount of automation that
eounties have implemented, a great deal of variety in the indexing mechanisms
presently used under U.C.C. Section 9-401 is also present. Some of the more
common searching variations include: alphabetically arranged filing cabinets,
daily computer printouts for the searcher to view, computer terminals for the
searcher to personally perform searches, and U.C.C.-11 forms for the searcher
to request office staff to perform searches.29
As a result of these variations, any discussion of searches must be genera-
lized, and not all observations made in this Note will be applicable in every
jurisdiction.
Though a simple notice filing system with greater certainty was the goal of
the Article 9 drafters, 30 the system in practice has yielded many situations in
which a simple search of the filing records, even with all of the financing state-
ments correctly completed and filed, may not yield all of the security interests
present for any given collateral. 3' As such, uncertainty is present in most filings,
resulting in anxiety for the practitioner who must assure clients (who are con-
templating entering into transactions) that there are no existing security inter-
ests in the proposed collateral.
Further, commentators have noticed problems in the operation of certain
Article 9 priority sections when there is a deviation from Article 9's general rule
of giving priority to the first creditor to file or perfect. 32 Examples of such devia-
tions include U.C.C. Section 9-308 which deals with the purchase of chattel
paper and instruments, and U.C.C. Section 9-306(5) which deals with the
transfer of accounts or chattel paper following a sale of goods.33
27. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) Alternative 2. Among the states adopting the second alternative are California, Illi-
nois, and New York.
28. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) Alternative 3. Among the states adopting the third alternative are Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Massachusetts. For a complete listing of the alternatives selected by each state and any variations added, see
9 ANDERSON. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 380-91 (1985).
29. In Ohio, the Secretary of State has an office designated for U.C.C.-I filings and searches. This office
implements a variety of techniques which may be used for searching. One method implemented is filing a U.C.C.-
11 form with the applicable debtor information and fee. The state employees will then perform the search and the
results are mailed to the search requester. (The search will be performed at the time of request if the search has
been requested in person.)
If a searcher is at the Secretary of State's office in person, he or she also has the option of typing in his or her
own search and visually receiving the information on the computer screen.
Additional search information is available from a booklet entitled The Ohio Uniform Commercial Code
Checklist issued by the Office of the Ohio Secretary of State.
30. See supra note 4.
31. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 9.
32. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
33. See Note, Priority Contests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Purposive Interpreta-
tion of a Statutory Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1155 (1986).
1418 [Vol. 51:1415
FINANCING STATEMENT SEARCHES
A practitioner filing a financing statement for a client and rendering an
opinion must not only deal with the problems mentioned above, but also with a
host of others; however, the focus of this Note is the result reached when a
subsequent creditor does not locate a previously filed financing statement due to
the prior creditor misnaming the debtor on the financing statement.3 4 As such,
the effects of the other possible pitfalls are beyond the scope of this Note and
will not be addressed in any detail.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
Numerous jurisdictions have had the opportunity to apply and interpret
U.C.C. Section 9-402(8) since the adoption of the Code, and the results have
not always been uniform. Professors White and Summers have responded to the
varying results by noting, "[i]t will come as no surprise that, for example, errors
which are regarded as minor and not seriously misleading in Pennsylvania are
treated as major and misleading in Maine. ' '3 5 The following discussion will ana-
lyze some of the decisions and evaluate the extent by which the policy objectives
of the Code were furthered by them. The cases discussed herein are not all-
inclusive; the number of cases decided in this area is said to exceed one
hundred. 36
A. Misnomers and the Notice System
There is no general rule by which a party can be sure that the error present
in the debtor's name on a financing statement will or will not be declared seri-
ously misleading.3" However, it has been suggested that a misspelling in the
debtor's last name is usually considered seriously misleading. 38
In First Agri Services, Inc. v. Kahl,39 the court was considering whether
financing statements that were initially correctly filed under the names of Gary
and Dale Kahl were to remain valid to cover future advances that were made
when the two formed a partnership and thus the debtor became Kahl Farms. 40
In reaching its decision, the court described the issue of whether a name was
seriously misleading as a mixed issue of law and fact.41 The court further stated
that:
The notice filing system was adopted to create a simple system to provide reliable
basic information to third persons without unduly burdening secured creditors. A fi-
nancing statement failing to convey the information which a reasonably diligent third
34. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) requires the name of the debtor to be placed on the financing statement and U.C.C. §
9-403(4) requires indexing by the debtor's name. "Misnaming," as used in this Note, refers not only to typograph-
ical errors, but also to errors caused by a creditor failing to obtain the appropriate name or spelling from the
debtor.
35. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE at 954 (2d ed. 1980).
36. 9 HAWKLAND. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES 409 (1986).
37. Id.
38. Hillman, Financing Statements: Errors and Omissions, 5 U.C.C. L.J. 209, 215 (1973).
39. 129 Wis. 2d 464, 385 N.W.2d 191 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
40. Id. at 467-68, 385 N.W.2d at 192.
41. Id. at 471, 385 N.W.2d at 194.
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person requires to identify potential competing security interests in the debtor's assets
is "seriously misleading. 42
Thus, the court seemed to base its decision on whether a third person would be
misled when formulating a search. This standard appears to be in line with the
purpose of the notice system, but does little to advance the goal of certainty that
the drafters had in mind.43 Whether a third party would be misled during a
search is an extremely subjective standard that creates uncertainty in the se-
cured transaction arena. Such a standard would require a searcher to measure
his searching abilities against what he perceives to be the ability of other
searchers in order to evaluate the thoroughness required.
The test of whether a third party would be misled when performing a
search44 would seem to explain the decision reached by the court in Reisdorf
Bros., Inc. v. Clinton Corn Processing Co.,45 where a creditor with a security
interest in crops misfiled a financing statement under the name of "Dragon
Grain Farms and Peter Dragon, individually" instead of "Dragan." 4 However,
any such explanation of the court's decision would be conjecture, as the court
offered no explanation into its logic nor guidance for future resolution of such
matters, and simply stated that the misnomer was seriously misleading.42
Such declarations by courts do little in the way of establishing effective
precedent for the future resolution of these issues. If a later court was called
upon to resolve the issue of whether a misnomer of "Simms" instead of "Sims"
was seriously misleading, little guidance could be extracted from the Reisdorf
Bros. opinion. Although the avoidance of admittedly harsh results is an admira-
ble goal, doing so at the expense of certainty may prove to be a price that is too
high to pay. In an alphabetical filing system where all of the records are visible
to the searcher either on screen or by hard copy (thus allowing a searcher to
view the names which precede and follow the name being searched), one would
doubt that a searcher would be misled during the "Simms" search; however, the
generalization that misspellings in the last name of the debtor are seriously mis-
leading48 would seem to support the conclusion that the error would in fact be
held to be seriously misleading. Such speculation is an inescapable side effect of
the flexible language of U.C.C. Section 9-402(8). In a system that requires ab-
solute precision, however, a searcher would know that all financing statements
filed under anything but the correct name and spelling would result in the mis-
taken party holding a junior interest. This type of uncertainty was the type of
variation feared by Justice Wilkins in his Haley opinion.49
In a similar case, the Superior Court of New Jersey was called upon to
decide whether a financing statement filed under the name of "Kaplas" rather
42. Id. at 472, 385 N.W.2d at 194 (emphasis added).
43. See supra note 23.
44. See supra note 42.
45. 130 A.D.2d 951, 516 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1987).
46. Id. at 951, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 38.
49. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
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than "Kaplan" was seriously misleading.50 The court, in holding that the filing
was in fact seriously misleading, emphasized the effect on searchers by stating,
"[t]hat error was seriously misleading since it deprived subsequent creditors
about to furnish credit to Kaplan of the opportunity of discovering defendant's
security interest .... .,51 At the same time, the court held that having an erro-
neous digit in the serial number of the description of the collateral was not
seriously misleading.5 2 This holding seems sound because the financing state-
ment is indexed under a debtor's name and not under the description of the
collateral."' Any prospective creditor that located a financing statement cover-
ing collateral that is similar to the proposed collateral would be on notice to
further inquire from the debtor into the nature of the previous collateral. A
misnamed debtor on the financing statement, however, will eliminate the oppor-
tunity for further inquiry as the prospective creditor will not have any indication
of the existence of the other creditor.
Whether a misnomer seriously misleads a third party searcher would seem
to be a factor of both the mistake in spelling, as well as the location of the error
within the name of the debtor. Thus, the addition of the extra "m" in the name
"Sims" would be considered less misleading by most courts than a mistake of
the first letter of a last name.
Although it is arguable that no searcher would be seriously misled in the
"Sims" example, this argument assumes that both financing statements are visi-
ble to the searcher. Under certain searches, this assumption may be the fatal
link in the logic. 5
4
Similarly, few would argue that an error in the first letter of the debtor's
last name, such as the slight procedural error of one key (on the standard key-
board) which would transform "Jones" into "Kones," would not result in a seri-
ously misleading error.
Such fine line drawing would be unnecessary under a system that required
absolute precision. Any error, however slight or wherever located, would result
in the holder of the security interest being found to be junior to any subsequent
creditor who correctly files. Although this result could yield harsh results for the
party with only a slight clerical error, it is no more harsh than the results exper-
ienced by the searcher who after correctly searching under the debtor's correct
name, is found to have a junior interest to the party whose slight error is found
not to be seriously misleading by the courts.
The above discussion has focused upon debtor filings that revolved primar-
ily around a single debtor name. These problems are relatively simple compared
with the complexity that is added when the names of business entities are used.
Courts have been presented with such complicated issues as where debtors, who
are individuals and have never been in certain lines of work, have had financing
50. Bank of No. America v. Bank of Nutley, 94 N.J. Super. 220, 227 A.2d 535 (1967).
51. 94 N.J. Super. at 226, 227 A.2d at 539 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. See supra note 8.
54. See infra Part V.
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statements filed under a business name,5 corporate misnomers, 56 and a host of
problems associated with trade names.57
Any rule adopted to resolve the relatively simple problems of single debtor
misnomers must be arrived at after due consideration is given to the application
of such a standard to the more complicated problems that arise concerning busi-
ness entities. Requiring absolute precision in the debtor's name on financing
statements would provide a workable standard in both individual, as well as
corporate debtor situations. This is not the standard endorsed by Professors
White and Summers, however, who prefer the "reasonably diligent searcher
test."58 In their discussion of U.C.C. Section 9-402(8) and debtor names,
Professors White and Summers note that a variety of empirical facts affect the
probability of finding a financing statement,59 and encourage the courts to focus
on whether a "reasonably diligent searcher" would locate the financing state-
ment considering these empirical facts. 60
Although this approach may yield what many consider the more equitable
result, these results come at the expense of certainty and judicial economy. Few
individuals will be able to successfully reach an amicable agreement on whether
a given financing statement is seriously misleading absent resorting to the litiga-
tion process. Under an absolute precision standard, two creditors interested in
the same collateral will be able to arrive at their relative priority rankings, with
little intervention of counsel, by simply establishing the date of filing and
whether there is an error in the debtor's name. Thus, the costs to the creditors,
as well as the costs to society due to a smaller case load in the courts, are
decreased by the exactness standard.
Reported decisions give little attention to the types of searches that were
used in the jurisdiction in which the disputes have arisen; however, the types of
searches available are extremely important in determining whether a financing
statement will actually be located.
V. COMPUTERIZATION AND FINANCING STATEMENT SEARCHES
Presently, a wide variety of searching techniques are being used throughout
the country.61 However, the complexity and precision that computerization
55. Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Ga.), arid 604 F.2d 669 (5th Cit. 1979). (International
Harvestor Company filed under Ansley Farms when Emory Ansley was never in the farming business).
56. See, e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. Mishkin's 125th St., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 386, 317 N.Y.S.2d 436
(1970).
57. The problems associated with misfilings when trade names are involved are so voluminous that they are
beyond the scope of this Note. However, for a discussion of this topic see Note, Trade Name Filing: Should it be
Sufficient to Perfect a Security Interest Under U.C.C. Section 9-402?, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 51 (1984).
58. See 2 J. WITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE, 374-75 (3d ed. 1988) (Practitioner's Ed.).
Professors White and Summers, in endorsing this approach, stated that this approach was favored "[plartly be-
cause we are persuaded that few creditors are misled by the misfilings which occur as a result of misspellings and
misplaced names ...." Id.
59. These empirical facts include: 1) Geographical location of filing, 2) Does name used sound like real
name? 3) Is the name highly unusual? Id. at 375.
60. Id.
61. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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brings to the practice of financing statement searches requires a reevaluation of
the current standards that are applied to financing statement errors.
Computerization of Article 9 financing statement records is not a new con-
cept. A recommendation toward the computerization of such records was di-
rected to the Mississippi Secretary of State in 1968.2 Further, the computeriza-
tion of the practice of law in general is becoming a way of life with innovations
occurring on a regular basis. 68 Because of technological advances, the law must
sometimes change to meet the challenges of a changing society or it may burden
the society it serves.6 '
The constructive notice imputed on a searcher by the courts has severe
ramifications if the searcher did not actually locate the financing statement.
Such a ruling often determines the outcome of the conflict due to the operation
of the first to file or perfect priority rule.6 5 A lender, entering into a transaction
after a seemingly thorough search and with the mistaken belief that he has the
only security interest in the collateral, may find himself subordinate to a prior
creditor's security interest. This could result in the debt being uncollectible in
the event of a debtor bankruptcy." As such, any standard adopted by a state
must perform equally well under either a computerized or manual system until
all systems within the state have been computerized.
Professors White and Summers have proposed that computerization of Ar-
ticle 9 financing statement indexes should not result in a need to replace the
"reasonable search" standard,67 and further added that "computer searches will
often be just as practical and sometimes easier than manual searches."'6 8
Although it is extremely difficult to generalize about any computerized
search due to the wide variation in software used by the various filing agencies,
certain searches may become more difficult due to the advent of computeriza-
tion. In discussing computerized searching, Professors White and Summers crit-
icize the decision of the court in Huntington National Bank v. Tri-State
Molded Plastics, Inc.6" In Huntington, the debtor changed its corporate name
from Tri-State Moulded Plastics, Inc. to Tri-State Molded Plastics, Inc. and the
court was called upon to decide whether the name change caused the financing
statements filed under "Moulded Plastics" to be seriously misleading.70 In
reaching its conclusion that the name change was seriously misleading, the
62. Robertson, Application of Data Processing Techniques to the Un(form Commercial Code Filing System:
A Modern Proposal For Mississippi, 39 Miss. L.J. 173, 186 (1968). Mr. Robertson gave credit for the idea of
computerization of the records to Professor Grant Gilmore.
63. See, e.g., Polansky, Technology Drives the Future, JUDOES' J., Spring 1989, at 1.
64. Modem advances are not only affecting secured transactions law. Changes in technology have resulted in
changes in nearly all areas of practice. For example, in the area of probate law see Alexander v. Alexander, 42
Ohio Misc. 2d 30, 537 N.E.2d 1310 (1988), in which the Franklin County Probate Court ordered disinterment of
a body in order to allow DNA tests in order to establish paternity.
65. See supra note 32.
66. If the collateral has a value of less than or equal to the debt owed to the prior creditor, the subsequent
creditor will receive nothing when the collateral is sold.
67. 2 J. WITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 58, at 377. However, it was noted that after time, it may become
necessary to redefine "reasonable search" due to the effects of computerization. Id.
68. Id. at 377.
69. 23 Bankr. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Fl. 1982).
70. Id. at 807-08.
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
court gave great weight to the fact that under the Ohio Secretary of State's
computerized system, the financing statements were not located.7 1 The impact
of the searching system is further emphasized by the fact that some of the same
financing statements were located in searches of the county filing system.72
Professors White and Summers base their criticism of the Huntington deci-
sion on the fact that a "reasonably diligent searcher" would have searched for,
and located, the misnomer due to the closeness of the two spellings.1 3 However,
requiring protracted searches of possible misnomers will greatly increase the
time and expense of searches, even assuming all reasonable misnomers could be
thought of.
An additional justification for not requiring absolute precision of debtor
names is the availability of wildcard characters in many computer searches.74
However, any rule which is adopted based upon a blind assumption that a wild-
card is available on every computer system could result in inequitable results in
many circumstances.75
Even assuming that there is no increase in searching difficulty due to com-
puterization, requiring the debtor's name to be precisely correct on a financing
statement will minimize the amount of search time for the computerized
searcher just as it would with the manual search-eliminating the need to
search under any name other than the debtor's exact name. Also, by allowing
both parties to the dispute to know the results of a priority dispute without
incurring the expense of litigation, the transaction costs are lowered for the en-
tire system.
VI. PROPOSED ADOPTION OF EXACTNESS STANDARD
By adopting U.C.C. Section 9-402(8), the drafters sought to avoid the
harshness that appeared to result when only a very minor error was present in
the financing statement.76 Oftentimes, this works to the detriment of the subse-
quent creditor who has found the correct debtor's name and correctly searched
under that name.7 While it would be difficult to argue that equity would never
allow such a result, such a rule should be adopted only after a thorough investi-
gation of all of the policy considerations. Once the policy considerations indicate
that such a result is desirable, it is necessary to consider whether the policies
sought to be furthered by the adoption of the standard are in fact furthered.
71. Id. at 809-10.
72. Id. at 807.
73. 2 J. WnITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 58, at 377.
74. One example of such a wildcard given by Professors White and Summers is the "s" used in Lexis
searches. Id. at 377.
75. Although the computer system used by the Ohio Secretary of State's office has a wildcard (the "%" for
the on-line searches) this information is not provided to searchers in The Ohio Uniform Commercial Code Check-
list, which is the guide provided by the Secretary of State to searchers. The wildcard information is only provided
after a specific request for the information is made to the office staff.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 12-23.
77. See supra note 32, by operation of the first to file or perfect priority rule.
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In the matter at hand, the drafters sought to replace the variety of pre-
Code techniques for reserving a security interest in commercial transactions 8
with a simple system that added greater certainty.79 From a policy perspective,
this goal was both laudable and necessary. With regard to U.C.C. Section 9-
402(8) specifically, the policy objective of the drafters was to avoid the harsh-
ness of the strict construction as was used in Haley.80 It is the contention of the
author that these two policy objectives may run counter to each other, and thus
the avoidance of a strict interpretation may breed uncertainty rather than
certainty.
A strict interpretation of the requirements for a financing statement 1
would result in a maximum amount of certainty. A creditor who files a financ-
ing statement under Article 9 would know, prior to the filing, that if one letter
in the debtor's name is incorrect, regardless of location, then the financing state-
ment will be ineffective against subsequent creditors. 82 Similarly, all subsequent
creditors will know that by obtaining the correct name of the debtor and search-
ing under that name, they are assured protection from misfilings. This interpre-
tation of Section 9-402(8) would ease the pressure on creditors caused by the
uncertainty of current searches, as well as the pressure on the courts to try to
formulate a logical and workable standard for deciding whether any given error
is seriously misleading. 83 Such a standard would also resolve the issue of to
what extent a creditor must search for misnomers of the debtor's name.8' This
standard was exactly the workable standard on which the decision was based in
Haley," in which Justice Wilkins stated "there is no hardship for an entruster
to see that the statutory requirements are met and the documents accurately
executed." 8
Although such a result may appear to be harsh at first glance, in operation
it is no more harsh than declaring that a subsequent creditor has constructive
notice of a misfiled financing statement which was never actually seen-and
hence loses in a priority contest-even though all actions taken were correct. At
least under the exactness standard, the party who is punished by the harsh oper-
ation of the law is the party who in fact made the mistake that causes the
problems in the first place.
Requiring absolute precision in the doing of an act or having the act de-
clared void would not be unique to secured transaction law, as such a standard
is regularly applied in the process of executing a will. 87 Such a flexible standard
as is currently applied to the debtor name in U.C.C. Section 9-402(8) is not
78. See supra note 2.
79. See supra note 4.
80. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 5.
82. Thus the creditor would be an unperfected secured creditor and would lose in a priority contest with a
perfected secured creditor. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 37-47.
84. See supra text accompanying note 73.
85. See 329 Mass. 559, 564, 109 N.E.2d 143, 146 (1952).
86. Id. at 565, 109 N.E.2d 143, 147 (1952).
87. See, e.g., In Re Estate of Peters, 107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987), in which the court stated,
"Ifailure to comply with the statutory requirements has long resulted in a will being declared invalid, no matter
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without a place in Article 9. There are many requirements for a complete fi-
nancing statement88 and the application of the "minor error not seriously mis-
leading" doctrine is appropriate when the issue is the incorrectness of the
debtor's signature, the debtor's address, the creditor's name and address, or the
description of the collateral.8 9 In these circumstances, the error is not without
importance,90 but the subsequent creditor has at least received notice that there
are other creditors involved with this debtor. The burden would then be on the
subsequent creditor to resolve the issue or suffer the consequences of having a
subordinate interest in the collateral.
By limiting the application of U.C.C. Section 9-402(8) to the items re-
quired by the financing statement other than the debtor's name,9' the policy
objectives of the drafters can best be served. Namely, the simple system of hav-
ing one type of instrument to create a security interest will be in place,92 while
at the same time, certainty will be furthered 93 as all creditors will know that
errors in the debtor's name will result in the creditor being declared
unperfected.
This interpretation is superior to the present situation in which it is un-
known whether any given misnomer will in fact be declared seriously mislead-
ing,94 and a great deal of variation in searching procedures may dictate whether
a financing statement is actually located by the creditor. 95
VII. CONCLUSION
Currently under U.C.C. Section 9-402(8) there is a great deal of uncer-
tainty concerning the amount of precision that will be required so that the spell-
ing of the debtor's name on the financing statement will ensure perfection.
Although the drafters sought to achieve certainty in the adoption of Article
9, the application of U.C.C. Section 9-402(8) to the debtor's name may have
generated greater uncertainty in order to avoid the harshness that was often
present in the pre-Code decisions.
As a result of computerization, a great deal of variation has evolved in the
actual searching techniques and the results that are available.
As such, the author proposes to limit the application of U.C.C. Section 9-
402(8) to situations in which the debtor's name is not involved, thus removing
the error ramifications in the filing system. This limit on application would act
to further the original goal of furthering certainty by allowing all creditors to
how accurately the document may have reflected the wishes of the testator." 107 N.J. at 270, 526 A.2d at 1008
(citation omitted).
88. See supra note 5.
89. For an example of the application of the not seriously misleading doctrine to the description of collateral
see Bank of No. America v. Bank of Nutley, 94 N.J. Super. 220, 227 A.2d 535 (1967).
90. A creditor may mistakenly believe that the same collateral is not involved if the description of the collat-
eral is in error, or may not be able to request information concerning the account as is allowed by U.C.C. § 9-208
if the creditor's information is wrong.
91. See supra note 5.
92. See supra note 4.
93. Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 37.
95. See supra Part V for a discussion of the effects of computerization on searching techniques.
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know that an error in the debtor's name is sure to result in the creditor being
declared unperfected. Such a limitation will also serve as a source of judicial
economy by allowing resolution of disputes without litigation, or by reducing
the scope of the litigation to establishing the financing statement and the true
debtor's name.
In short, creditors in the future must heed the advice given since the adop-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code, that is: "[c]are and precision in the
preparation, execution, and presentation of these papers for filing as the first
and best step in securing the benefits of the recording statutes cannot be too
strongly recommended." 96
Todd D. Penney
96. Lomenzo, Some Problems Confronting a Secretary of State in Connection With the U.C.C. Filing Pro-
cess, 5 U.C.C. L.J. 228, 231 (1973).
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